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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ARAB SPRING: TEN SHORT-TERM
LESSONS LEARNED
PAUL R. WILLIAMS* AND COLLEEN (BETSY) POPKEN**
As the Arab Spring states continue down the long path towards democracy, it
is important to reflect upon the previous year of the Arab Spring in order to better
understand what actions will help to bring future stability to the region. Originally
presented as part of a panel on U.S. foreign policy and the Arab Spring, this article
sets forth ten observations about the Arab Spring from two public international law
practitioners working with clients in several Arab Spring states, including Tunisia,
Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. In particular, these observations seek to
contribute to a more complete and balanced understanding of the Arab Spring, to
inform the decisions of policymakers and analysts in the months ahead.
1. THE U.S. IS WILLING TO CONSIDER POLICY OPTIONS BEYOND "MAINTAIN THE
STATUS QUO"
For decades, the U.S. has sought to maintain the status quo in the Middle
East,' particularly in the Arab Spring states, by relying on dictatorships to provide
stability in the region. A review of U.S. foreign policy over the last year, however,
reveals that in limited circumstances, the U.S. is willing to loosen its traditional
attachment to the status quo in favor of democratic change. In nearly all of the
Arab Spring states, the U.S. has moved away from long-standing relations-and in
some cases, devoted allies-to support pro-democracy movements.
Although Egyptian activists criticized the U.S. government for its tardy
condemnation of President Mubarak, in reality, it took only one week for the
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2012), http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2012/0106/ca/smith-transition.html.
47
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
administration to call for a transition to a representative government. In so doing,
President Obama noted that, "the status quo is not sustainable." 2 Mubarak ruled
Egypt for three decades, during which time he forged close bonds with many in the
administration. A U.S. reversal of policy-however tepid-to abandon support for
a ruler described as a "friend" by officials, including Hillary Clinton and Dick
Cheney, represents a serious and surprising willingness to reevaluate the U.S.'s
relationship with states that were once staunch allies.3
In Libya, historically tense relations with Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi likely
made it easier for the U.S. to abandon its support for the dictatorship. And yet,
despite Qadhafi's role in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103-which resulted in
the deaths of hundreds of U.S. citizens-as well as the regime's notorious
intimidation, torture, imprisonment, and murder of Libyan citizens, relations
between the U.S. and Libya had in fact begun to warm in recent years. This is
largely attributable to the U.S.'s increased reliance on Qadhafi for cooperation in
the post-9/11 War on Terror. Despite these improved relations, just fourteen days
after the uprising began, President Obama called upon Qadhafi to step down.
Another fourteen days later, the U.S. supported, and indeed largely drafted, a U.N.
Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to end Qadhafi's rule.4
Notwithstanding the eventual willingness of the U.S. to break from the status
quo in Libya and Egypt, its support of the Arab Spring pro-democracy movements
has been neither unconditional nor uniform. The response of the U.S. appears in
some instances to depend on the likelihood that the ruler's ousting is inevitable. In
Syria, for example, over five months passed with the death toll exceeding the tens
of thousands before President Obama finally called upon President Bashar al-
Assad to step down.5 Since then, the U.S. has only matched this demand with
sanctions and diplomatic slaps on the wrist. Additionally, the response by the U.S.
to the violent suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain, the strategic
headquarters of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, has been notably muted. The U.S. has
been critical of the minority-Sunni monarchy's arrest and detention of Shiite pro-
democracy movement members, but such criticism has fallen short of support for a
democratic transition.
2. Karen DeYoung, Obama Presses Mubarak to Move "Now, " WASH. POsT (Feb. 2, 2011), http
://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/01/AR2011020106860.html; Marc Lynch,
America and Egypt After the Uprisings, 25 SURVIVAL 31,32-37 (April-May 2011), available at http://
www.marclynch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/survival-america-egypt.pdf.
3. Michael Blood, Cheney Calls Mubarak A Good Friend, U.S. Ally, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6,
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.comI/2011/02/06/cheney-calls-mubarak-a-good-friend_n_819196.
html; Glenn Kessler, Obama and Mubarak and Democracy-An Accounting, WASH. POsT (Jan. 29,
2011), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fact-checker/201 1/01/obama and mubarak and democrac.
html.
4. CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL 33142, LIBYA: UNREST AND U.S.
POLICY 3-4 (2009).
5. Ian Black, Syrian Death Toll Rises as Arab States Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011 /aug/08/syria-deaths-arab-states-protest; JEREMY M. SHARP &
CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL33487, ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: U.S.
AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, SUMMARY (2012).
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Thus, while the U.S. is showing some willingness to consider options other
than the status quo in Arab Spring states, it is hesitating to do so where change is
perceived as too risky. As a result, and unfortunately for the Syrian and Bahraini
pro-democracy movements, the U.S.'s risk analysis does not always fall in favor of
taking actions necessary to support a democratic transition. In making this
observation, it is also important to remember that the U.S.'s trend towards
loosening its embrace on the status quo is not irreversible. Given unfortunate post-
conflict developments in Egypt and Libya, it may only be a matter of time before
the U.S. reverts to its traditional approach of relying on undemocratic leaders in
the name of stability. Indeed, this may be a part of the administration's current
calculation on Syria. Nonetheless, the U.S.'s actions in some of the Arab Spring
states demonstrates a recognition of the value gained in supporting democratic
movements in lieu of maintaining the status quo.
2. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IS ALIVE AND WELL
The Muslim Brotherhood has emerged from the Arab Spring as a winner.
Prior to the Arab Spring, Arab dictators often attempted to suppress the
controversial Muslim Brotherhood, which they viewed as a source of political
opposition. Despite this, the Muslim Brotherhood has emerged as a leader in the
post-conflict periods and in some cases, during the initial movements toward
democratic transition.
Although youth activists sparked the Egyptian pro-democracy movement, the
Muslim Brotherhood has emerged as the principle opposition party and will likely
be successor to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ("SCAF") in post-
Mubarak Egypt. With organizational structures and fundraising plans already in
place, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party secured the largest
number of parliamentary seats-more than forty-seven percent-in the state's first
post-Mubarak parliamentary elections. 6 The Muslim Brotherhood in Libya is also
gaining traction since the revolution ended. Though smaller than its Egyptian
counterpart and with less historical opportunity to organize, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Libya formed its first political party-the Justice and Construction
Party-in November 2011.7 The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has emerged as a
major player too. It has the highest percentage of members in the opposition party
Syrian National Council ("SNC"), and members of the Muslim Brotherhood serve
on some of the most influential committees within the SNC.8 In Tunisia, the
moderate Islamist Ennahda Party, which was inspired by the Muslim
6. Egypt's Islamist Parties Win Elections to Parliament, BBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 16665748.
7. Omar Ashour, Libya's Muslim Brotherhood Faces the Future, BROOKINGS (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/09-muslim-brotherhood-ashour.
8. Martin Chulov, Syria Endgame: Who and What Will Emerge From the Ruins?, THE
GUARDIAN (July 21, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/21/syria-bashar-al-assad-free-sy
nan-army.
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Brotherhood,9 won forty-one percent of the seats in the Constituent Assembly and
has formed a government with two center-left secular parties.'0
What does the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a major player mean
for the future of the Arab Spring states? It is difficult to know whether the Muslim
Brotherhood's rise is a result of actual support for its ideology, empathy for the
group as representative of the oppressed masses, or respect for an entity capable of
delivering during a time of important transition. The rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood likely reveals a rather unsurprising desire for religion to play a greater
role in post-Arab Spring states. However, more surprising-and concerning-is
the success of Salafist parties in Egypt and their slow rise in revolutionary Syria.
Together, these trends suggest future tensions between those who would like to see
a secular, democratic state in the Western tradition and those who would prefer
their new state to be governed by Islamic law.
The effects of this emergence are yet to be seen, but one thing is certain: the
Muslim Brotherhood is now a major player in the region. While the U.S. may
disagree with certain policies and beliefs of the Muslim Brotherhood, U.S. policy-
makers would benefit from a serious reconsideration of their arms-length
relationship with the Brotherhood.
3. THE ARAB LEAGUE IS PLAYING IN THE BIG LEAGUES
Though the effectiveness of the Arab League's actions may be debated, the
League has undeniably played a significant role in the Arab Spring. At a
minimum, the events of the Arab Spring have afforded the League an enhanced
status in regional conflict resolution. After two controversial interventions in Iraq
and Afghanistan, Western states have happily allowed the Arab League to take the
lead in the Arab Spring. However, internal divisions and weak enforcement
mechanisms have prevented the Arab League from taking consistently effective
action. Though unilateral action by the Arab League may be insufficient to
facilitate democratic transition, the League's increased role in the international
dialogue shows that the world may prefer Arab-led solutions to Arab Spring
conflicts.
In the early days of the Arab Spring, the Arab League was hesitant to strongly
condemn the Tunisian and Egyptian authoritarian regimes. The Arab League was
largely quiet during the pro-democracy movements and subsequent transitions in
both states, though the uprisings were relatively quick compared to what followed
in Libya and Syria. After President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia, Arab
League Secretary-General Amr Moussa predicted that the unrest in Tunisia would
spread to the entire region, and called for an Arab "renaissance" to alleviate the
poor living conditions in many Arab states." Similarly, in Egypt, Amr Moussa
9. Aidan Lewis, Profile: Tunisia's Ennahda Party, BBC NEwS (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15442859.
10. ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21666, POLITICAL TRANSITION IN TUNISIA,
SUMMARY (2011).
11. Arab Leaders Warned of 'Revolution, ' AL JAZEERA (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.co
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called upon President Mubarak to institute serious reforms that would lead to
multi-party democracy, though he did not urge Mubarak to resign.12
After taking a relatively restrained position during the Egyptian and Tunisian
revolutions, the Arab League took a more aggressive position toward the Libyan
and Syrian dictators. In Libya, calls for a no-fly zone went unanswered until the
Arab League decided that it supported the plan, at which time the Western states
took action. In fact, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 expressly "[took] note
... of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011
to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation . . . ."13
However, some Arab League representatives retracted support for the no-fly zone
once they saw what was required to enforce such measures.14
In Syria, the Arab League reacted quickly with warnings, and then suspended
the state's membership when those warnings failed to yield results.15  The Arab
League also imposed sanctions on the Syrian government, though the
implementation of such sanctions is voluntary for member states. In addition, the
Arab League has engaged in peace efforts, which have included promoting a
transition plan, and setting up a short-lived observer mission in Syria to monitor
the human rights situation.' 7  Unfortunately, however, the regime rejected the
transition plan,1i and the international community criticized the observer mission
for its ineffectiveness as well as for the fact it was led by a Sudanese military
commander associated with the genocide in Darfur.19 Recently, the Arab League
referred the situation to the U.N. 20 Ultimately, though Arab League actions in
Syria have been unsuccessful thus far in ending the violence, its measures far
exceed those taken in the initial year of the conflict by other international
organizations.
m/news/middleeast /2011/01/2011119165427303423.html.
12. Keith Weir, Arab League Head Wants Egypt Multi-party Democracy, REUTERS (Jan. 30,
2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFLDE70TOB620110130?sp=true.
13. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
14. Edward Cody, Arab Group Decries West's Broad Air Campaign in Libya, WASH. POST, Mar.
21, 2011, at Al3, available at http://english.htu.cn/washington%20post/2011/03/21/Axl3.pdf.
15. Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria Over Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-
over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html?pagewanted=all.
16. Arab League: Carry Out, Monitor Syria Sanctions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/29/arab-league-carry-out-monitor-syria-sanctions.
17. Rene Wadlow, Syria-Arab League Observer Mission, PEACE AND COLLABORATIVE
DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/forum/topics
/syria-arab-league-observer-mission?xgsource=activity.
18. Syria Rejects Arab League Transition Plan, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.aljazeera
.corn/news/ middleeast/2012/01/201212305618873831 .html.
19. Kareem Fahim, Chief ofArab League's Mission in Syria is Lightning Rod for Criticism, N. Y.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/world/middleeast/arab-league-criticized-
over-syria-observer-mission.htmlpagewanted=all.
20. Yasmine Saleh & Lin Noueihed, Arab League Proposes New Plan for Syrian Transition,
REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/22/us-syria-idUSTRE804 IA82012
0122.
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The lack of an effective response to the violence in Syria is not unique to the
Arab League, and indeed, Western insistence on Arab League leadership may
actually represent a stalling tactic. While a regional solution is important, the West
must recognize the limits of the Arab League and take action itself when the Arab
League has reached them. Similarly, to continue to be relevant the Arab League
will need to embrace more emphatically the responsibilities that the new regional
environment demands of it, including reevaluating the structure of the
organization. Additionally, the Arab League would benefit from serious
encouragement of its member states to institute internal democratic reforms. In the
end, a more active regional organization capable of protecting democratic interests
and promoting true stability may lessen the need for Western intervention.
In making this observation, it is also worth noting that the Arab League is not
the only regional organization involved in Arab Spring conflict resolution. In
particular, when the Arab League was mostly silent, the Gulf Cooperation Council
("GCC") played an important role in the transition of Yemen's President Saleh
from power. The GCC initiatives were ultimately successful in brokering a deal,
in which Saleh handed power to Vice President Abdurabu Mansour Hadi to
institute constitutional reform and supervise open elections.21 However, there are
concerns that a more active GCC, which largely represents the interests of
established Sunni-and especially Saudi-monarchies, may actually be
detrimental to democratic progress. 22 Similar concerns were expressed about the
Arab League's silence during the largely Shia-led pro-democracy movements in
Bahrain. 23 Thus, in relying upon the Arab League and other regional organizations
like the GCC in the future, policy-makers and analysts will need to be aware of the
potentially competing interests of individual member states, as well as the
organizations' capabilities and shortcomings.
4. R2P MATURES, BUT IS USED INCONSISTENTLY
The Responsibility to Protect ("R2P") has evolved from a policy vision
discussed and debated by academics to a norm adopted by the U.N. Security
Council. R2P first emerged in response to the debate on the legality of
humanitarian intervention in several humanitarian crises in the 1990s. R2P
consists of three pillars: (1) states' responsibility to protect their own citizens; (2)
the international community's responsibility to aid states in protecting their
21. Arab League Body Wants to Suspend Syria, Yemen Membership, REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL5E7KKORX20110920; Hugh Naylor & Hakim
Almasmari, The Election Only One Man Can Win-But Yemen is Used to That, THE NATIONAL (Feb.
16, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/the-election-only-one-man-can-win-but-
yemen-is-used-to-that.
22. Mehran Kamrava, The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution, 56 ORBIS 96, 96
(2011), available at http://wwwl8.georgetown.edu/data/people/mk556/publication-61403.pdf; Saudi
Arabia in the New Middle East, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 26,2012), http://www.cfr.org
/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-new-middle-east/p27205.
23. Bill Law, How the Arab League Embraced Revolution, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2011), http://ww
w.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-15948031.
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citizens; and, (3) timely and decisive action by the international community if
states manifestly fail to do so. 24 Libya and Syria represent perhaps the two
strongest candidates for humanitarian intervention under the third pillar of R2P.
The military intervention in Libya represented the first time, since the
articulation of the doctrine, that the international community employed the full
extent of the measures available under the third pillar. With Security Council
Resolution 1973, the U.N. authorized, and NATO then enforced, many of the
military options available under the third pillar. These included (1) the use of "all
necessary measures" to enforce the resolution; (2) the protection of all "civilian
populated areas . . . including Benghazi"; (3) the protection of areas "under threat
of attack"; (4) an exception to the arms embargo for the protection of civilians; (5)
an exclusion of a "foreign occupation force" that still allowed for limited presence
on the ground; and (6) a no-fly zone with teeth.25 The success of the intervention
in Libya has set a precedent for the circumstances in which R2P should be
invoked, as well as for the appropriate military measures that may be used in its
enforcement. In this way, the Arab Spring has led to the further refinement of R2P
and the available options to states considering humanitarian intervention.
When the security situation in Syria took a turn for the worse, with the
government directly targeting civilians, the Syrian democratic forces began to
demand from the international community certain protections that their
counterparts in Libya received: a no-fly zone, targeted airstrikes, arms to defend
themselves, and safe zones (though in Libya, all "civilian populated areas" were
given protection).26 In fact, the Syrian pro-democracy movement has named
different Friday protests after the protections they are seeking, for instance,
October 28, 2011 was "No-Fly Zone Friday." 27
Despite the Syrian democratic movement's requests for protection, the
international community has yet to move beyond limited sanctions and pinprick
diplomacy. This is perhaps due to the international community's systemic
reluctance to undertake humanitarian intervention. Additionally, it appears that the
circumstances that contributed to the success of R2P in Libya may be hindering its
application in Syria. Intervention in Libya was supported in large part because the
Arab League endorsed it. The notion that such regional support is necessary for
intervention under R2P gained further credence after President Obama's "A
Responsibility to Act" speech, which cited Arab world support as a major reason
for the intervention. As a result, some have argued that action cannot be taken
24. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-
General to the General Assembly, I l1 (a)-(c), U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
25. S.C. Res. 1973, 1 4, 6-12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1970,1119, 24,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
26. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
27. Shadi Hamid, Why We Have a Responsibility to Protect Syria, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2012/01/why-we-have-a-responsibility-to-protect-
syria/251908/.
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without the consent of major regional players,28 though such an argument may
defeat the underlying purpose of R2P. Indeed, in Syria, R2P has only been helpful
in its capacity as an advocacy tool for Syrians, but it has failed to provide a solid
basis for any meaningful action. Thus, while intervention in Libya is a significant
step forward for the third pillar of R2P, it has not yet prompted consistent or
decisive application in the Arab Spring.
5. THE BRIC COUNTRIES MAY NOT BE READY-OR EAGER-FOR PRIMETIME
If the Arab Spring has shown that the Arab League may be ready for a greater
role in world politics, the opposite is true of two of the four "BRIC" (Brazil,
Russia, India and China) countries-Brazil and India. Despite the hopes of many,
their apparent disinterest in supporting the broad consensus for support of the Arab
Spring pro-democracy movements raises serious questions as to whether they are
ready to transform their successful economic development into global political
leadership. And, in the case of the other two BRIC countries, Russia and China,
they continue to more or less adhere to their traditional positions of supporting
sovereignty and non-interference over the principles of democratic transformation.
As a result, although the BRIC states aligned themselves with the initial
sanctions in Libya, participated in the condemnation of the government
crackdowns in Yemen, and supported an observer mission in Syria, they have
blocked meaningful action in Syria, and appear ready to put the brakes on
democratic transformations in the region.
When the international community was organizing and implementing a
response to the conflict in Libya, Brazil and India were happy to cede leadership to
the traditional powerhouses-the U.S., U.K., and France. Indeed, the BRIC
countries constituted four-fifths of the Security Council states that abstained from
Resolution 1973, with the fifth being Germany.29 The individual fears that the
BRIC countries voiced when explaining their abstentions, which mostly
emphasized unpredicted consequences of intervention and difficulties with
implementation, turned out to be unfounded. In the case of Russia and China, the
states were protecting their longstanding interests in sovereignty and non-
intervention. In the case of Brazil and India, their abstentions reflected a hesitancy
to accept their responsibilities as Security Council member states to assume the
weight of leadership and either endorse humanitarian intervention or stand firmly
against it.
In Syria, both Russia and China vetoed the two initial resolutions that came
before the U.N.-including one condemning the use of force against civilians in
Syria. Their opposition to these resolutions rested mostly on principles of non-
28. E.g., James Traub, Intervention in Syria is Morally Justified-and Completely Impractical,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/article/world/I00615/syria-symposium-inter
vention-arab-league.
29. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' Over Libya,
Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,
U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
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intervention and respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, though
Russia also expressed concern that the second resolution was unbalanced in its
treatment of rebel forces. Additionally, Russia has refused to support any initiative
that would facilitate "regime change," or a transition of Assad from power.30
Though Russia and China recently voted in favor of Resolution 2042, which
authorized deployment of some unarmed U.N. military observers into Syria, they
only did so following extended negotiations to ensure that the Resolution dealt
equally with the Assad regime and the Syrian pro-democracy movements.3'
6. THERE IS INCENTIVE TO PLAN FOR THE "DAY AFTER"
Pro-democracy movements and their leaders are learning about the challenges
they will face in a post-conflict transition period, and are beginning to take steps to
plan for these difficulties before they arise. In particular, they are learning from
the mistakes that others have made, for instance in Iraq and the Balkans, and are
reaching out to experts who have tackled these issues before. They are finding that
there are many incentives to developing "day after" plans early on-before gaining
power, or even the upper hand.
In general, pro-democracy movements are learning that their ability to
anticipate challenges that are likely to arise during the transition period will make
them easier to overcome. A transition plan can also demonstrate the responsibility
and capability of a state's future leadership. Additionally, a proactive transition
plan that outlines what the democratic forces hope to accomplish post
transformation can encourage stakeholders, both within and outside the state, to
support the pro-democracy movement's efforts. Early transition planning can also
help to identify qualified individuals to groom for leadership roles in a new
government, and may afford the time and opportunity to obtain the resources
necessary for a healthy democracy. Such plans may also be useful in identifying
and approaching potential funders for various initiatives prior to the transition.
In Egypt, when youth activists first took to the streets simply seeking
"democracy and freedom," they did not anticipate how their protests would end or
what they would achieve. 32 They certainly were not prepared for the speed with
which Mubarak resigned and the military assumed the reins of power. As a result,
relatively little advance planning took place to shape what post-Mubarak Egypt
would look like. After Mubarak resigned, Egyptians were left scrambling to plan
forums to educate one another about elections, constituent assemblies, and
30. Colum Lynch, Russia and China Veto Security Council Resolution Condemning Syria,
FOREIGN POLICY TURTLE BAY BLOG (Oct. 4, 2011), http://turlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/
04/russia and china veto security council resolution condemning syria.
31. S.C. Res. 2042, 1 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (Apr. 14, 2012); Security Council Unanimously
Approves Observers for Syria, USA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2012, 4:41 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/world/story/2012-04-14/syria-shelling/54269782/1.
32. Shaimaa Fayed, Egypt Presidential Elections: Democratic Vote Won't Erase Arab Spring
Country's Mubarak Memories, HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20
12/05/22/egypt-presidential-elections n 1535438.html.
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democratic reforms. In the meantime, SCAF took this opportunity to fill the void
and continue a modified version of the earlier system of authoritarian rule.
Ironically, inherent in this observation is the recognition that the longer the
conflict is, the more time there is to plan for the transition period. Syrian
opposition members are taking advantage of the unfortunate length of the conflict
in their state to plan for post-Assad Syria. 34 Naturally, Syrians outside of the
country who are not faced with the challenges of protecting their families or
overthrowing the regime have more time to do so. But as long as planning is being
done, and connections are being made with all interested parties, then one can hope
that whoever ends up in power after the fall of Assad will have access to a well-
developed transition plan for the state.
Even with plans in place, however, the Arab Spring states are learning that
their implementation during the transition period is naturally quite challenging. In
Libya, the National Transitional Council ("NTC") focused significant effort on
transition planning, and yet they still face many difficulties in a post-Qadhafi era-
including how to administer transitional justice and foster reconciliation, the role
of religion in the new constitution, and how to enforce security and encourage
disarmament among a diverse group of actors. 35  Even Tunisia, which has
successfully held elections for a National Constituent Assembly and is making
progress in drafting their constitution, faces key challenges, such as how to deal
with dissent and stimulate a stagnant economy.
7. JUSTICE IS A TOP DEMAND
Justice is a top demand of Arab Spring pro-democracy movements. Those
seeking a democratic transition not only want their dictators to step down; they
want them held accountable for the crimes they committed during the uprising and
throughout their time in power. When Yemen's former President Saleh received
amnesty as part of his negotiated transition from power, democracy activists took
to the streets in protest.
33. Yasser M. EI-Shimy, The Final Task for Egypt's Brass, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2012), http://w
ww.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/opinion/the-final-task-for-egypts-brass.html.
34. See Pub. Int'l. Law & Policy Grp., Planning for Syria's "Day After" -Security, Rule of Law
& Democracy (Mar. 2012), available at http://gallery.mailchimp.com/91ab76eaf4f3105e695b69fac/
files/PILPG Report Planning for Syrias DayAfter.pdf.
35. Libya: Challenges Abound in post-Gaddafi Era, NEWSFROMAFRICA (Sept. 15, 2012),
http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_13559.html; Luke Harding, Chris Stevens,
US Ambassador to Libya, killed in Benghazi Attack, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 2 /sep/l2/chris-stevens-us-ambassador-libya-killed.The challenges
faced by Lybia are exemplified by increased violence in the region. For example, in September 2012,
the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, was killed after Islamist militants fired rocked at their car
in the Libyan town of Benghazi.
36. IMF Survey: Tunisia Faces Economic, Social Challenges amid Historic Transformation,
INT'L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/CARO90
512A.htm.
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But what does it mean for justice to be served and who is to administer it?
Some Arab League dictators have simply fled, while others have been imprisoned
or killed. Likewise, some Arab Spring pro-democracy movements have called for
justice by international courts, namely the International Criminal Court ("ICC"),
while others have insisted on justice at home. As to the latter, few will soon forget
the image of Mubarak standing trial in a cage. Egyptians wanted an Egyptian trial
and Egyptian justice for their dictator. Libyans, on the other hand, initially
embraced the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC and the subsequent
indictments of Colonel Qadhafi, the Colonel's son, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, and
Libyan intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senoussi. However, when the time came for
justice to be served, Libyans instead wanted local justice. Those who watched the
video of Qadhafi's demise online are unlikely to forget the fate he suffered at the
hands of his captors. Additional questions regarding the Libyan commitment to
international justice have arisen since Saif al-Islam was captured, disguised as a
Bedouin in the Sahara desert last November. He now sits in a Libyan prison, and
is currently the subject of argument between the new Libyan authorities and the
ICC regarding where he should be tried. Similarly, Abdullah al-Senoussi was
recently captured in a Mauritanian airport carrying a fake passport. Now, the ICC
is asking for Mauritania's cooperation in surrendering him to the Court, while the
NTC calls for his extradition to Tripoli.37
In another instance, while Tunisia did not have much time for planning before
the transition period began, the state has employed a range of tools to pursue
transitional justice. The interim government established three separate
commissions to investigate constitutional reforms, corruption, and crimes
committed against the population during the pro-democracy demonstrations.
Although Ben Ali and his family fled, the government continues to seek his
extradition and has begun trials in absentia.3 8 Other officials from his regime are
also awaiting trial. Additionally, the government has sought help from NGOs to
improve its capacity to prosecute war criminals.
Finally, while Arab Spring pro-democracy movements are eager for
accountability, they are also aware of truth and reconciliation measures that can
benefit a country in transition. Truth and reconciliation measures, however, are
not always compatible with demands for strict accountability. In light of the
complex considerations involved in the transition, incorporating plans for
transitional justice into "day after" planning efforts may increase the likelihood of
lasting success for Arab Spring pro-democracy movements in the transition and
post-transition periods.
37. Rami al-Shaheibi, ICC: Libya has Evidence of Killing by Gadhafi Son, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl 407190.pdf.
38. David D. Kirkpatrick, Ex-Tunisian President Found Guilty, in Absentia, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/world/middleeast/21 tunisia.html?_r-0.
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8. INTERIM GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
OR MORE-OF-THE-SAME
Arab Spring pro-democracy movements should be aware of the possibility for
counter-revolution. This is partly due to the fact that, many times, states
experiencing democratic transition are often fragile in the wake of violent conflict,
and are thus vulnerable to counter-revolution. New governments or opposition
figures planning for the transition period should thus put mechanisms in place to
identify potential spoilers and create incentives and punishments to deter counter-
revolutionary behavior. On the other hand, new governments should make sure
not to punish an entire group of people solely on the basis that they were loyal to
the last regime. Arab Spring states can learn from the mistake in Iraq, for example,
of conducting a wholesale de-baathification of the regime, rather than a careful
vetting process.
Additionally, striking a balance between protecting civil rights, particularly
freedom of expression, and preventing the transition from being hijacked by
counter-revolutionaries is difficult. Nearly all of the new Arab Spring
governments have at some point stifled legitimate political dissent in ways that run
counter to the principles of freedom and democracy that inspired the pro-
democracy movements in the first place. In Egypt and Tunisia, for instance,
security forces have continued to use excessive, and sometimes lethal, force to
silence groups who criticize the nature or pace of the transition process.39
In the post-conflict jockeying for power, groups seeking a democratic
transition should also be aware of those who may have fought for change, but
whose ambitions are too similar to the recently departed dictator. When strong
authority is all a state knows, the fight to fill that authority gap can lead to more of
the same. In Egypt, for instance, some of the original January 25th pro-democracy
movement members now believe that they were better off under Mubarak's rule
than they currently are under the SCAF. In Libya, on the other hand, it remains
unclear which elements of the original pro-democracy movement will ultimately
be in charge and how regional interests will be represented in the new government,
which incidentally has resulted in a surge of post-Qadhafi violence.
Similarly, there is the possibility of trading true democratic reform for peace
and stability. In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh handed formal power to his Vice
President. However, Saleh remains the leader of the General People's Congress
Party, which is well represented in the cabinet. This has allowed him to continue
to play a major role in Yemeni politics, and many fear that he is using his position
to sabotage the coalition government and democratic progress.
39. Elliott Abrams, Op-Ed., In Tunisia, Press Freedoms are in the Crosshairs, WASH. POST (Mar.
I1, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/tunisias-press-is-coming-under-attack/2012 /03/11
/gIQA5Dgx5R story.html; Egypt: Dismantle Tools of Repression, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 16,
2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/16/egypt-dismantle-tools-repression; Tunisia: Dismantle
Repressive Ben-Ali-Era Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www. hrw.org/ news /20
11/1 2/17/tunisia-dismantle-repressive-ben-ali-era-laws.
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9. REBELS MUST BE MEDIA-SAVVY
The Arab Spring has taught us that rebels must be media savvy. Many
analyses of the Arab Spring have focused on the role that social media has played
in sparking and facilitating the revolutions. For instance, media has contributed to
showing those in the Arab world what other systems of governance are available.
Additionally, social media enabled rebels inside the Arab Spring states to
communicate with the international community, and within their own ranks, to a
degree that would have been impossible only five years ago. And pro-democracy
activists have used social media to organize protests and events on the ground
during the uprisings and to keep rebels in one town or city apprised of what is
going on in another.
Importantly, rebels are also using social media and the Internet as a tool to
market themselves, their ideas, and their needs. This has allowed them to gain
support both from their counterparts within their own states as well as from the
international community. The NTC's website explicitly states that its goal was to
connect Libyans to the outside world so that their voice could be heard.40 In some
cases, pro-democracy movements have used the Internet to facilitate and
encourage military operations. For example, the SNC's website published four
maps that showed the location and type of Syria's air defense systems.41
The role of media in facilitating the Arab Spring also has lessons for new
governments. Egypt's attempt to put an end to the pro-democracy movement by
closing off access to the Internet-presumably eliminating the movement's ability
to communicate-actually backfired. Unable to communicate with each other
remotely, dissenters were forced into the streets to reach one another, leading to an
increase in the size and intensity of the pro-democracy movement.42
10. Do NOT FORGET SOUTH SUDAN AND IRAQ
Since the Arab Spring began, much time and effort has been directed to
deciphering what combination of factors led to the 2011 pro-democracy
movements, which have now spilled over into 2012. Many studies attribute the
Arab Spring to the rising level of education in the region, the lack of decent jobs
available, and the growth of social media, without examining other democratic
trends that have developed in the region.43 Few, however, acknowledge the two
40. The Council's Statement, THE LIBYAN INTERIM NATIONAL COUNCIL, www.ntclibya.org/englis
h/ (last visited October 22, 2012).
41. David Kenner, Syria National Council Publishes Maps of Syrian Air Defenses **updated,
FOREIGN POLICY PASSPORT BLOG (Oct. 3, 2011), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/03/syrian
nationalcouncilpublishes maps of syrian air defenses.
42. Noam Cohen, Egyptians Were Unplugged, and Uncowed, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/02/2 1/business/media/2 I ink.html.
43. Sarah Hamdan, Arab Spring Spawns Interest in Improving Quality of Higher Education, N. Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/world/middleeast/arab-spring-spawns-in
terest-in-improving-quality-of-higher-education.html; Adeel Malik & Bassem Awadallah, The
Economics of the Arab Spring, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AFRICAN ECONs. (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/csae-wps-2011-23.pdf; Ekaterina Stepanova, The Role of
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most recent changes from dictatorship to democracy that took place in the Arab
Spring states' backyard-in Iraq and South Sudan-as contributing factors. Any
discussion of the Arab Spring would thus be remiss without analyzing its
relationship to the democratic transitions in these two states.
In January of 2005, the Iraqi people voted in the first democratic elections the
state had ever seen. In the wake of U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq almost seven
years later, President Obama related that, "Iraq is not a perfect place, but we are
leaving a sovereign, stable and self-reliant country with a representative
government elected by its people."44 Parallels can be drawn between the
aspirations for freedom and democracy of the Iraqi people during that time and the
Arab Spring pro-democracy movements over the last year. 45 While democratic
fervor in Iraq may have finally rubbed off on other Arab states, the U.S. invasion
of Iraq may have alternatively delayed the desire for democracy in the Arab
world.46 Though the exact effect of Iraq's transition cannot be quantified, the birth
of the Arab Spring cannot be analyzed without it.
Likewise, the momentum of the Arab Spring must be examined in light of the
recent self-determination of the South Sudanese. Though northern Sudan still
suffers from the authoritarian grip of President Omar al-Bashir, the South
Sudanese are squarely on the path of democracy. The timeline for preparing the
South, set forth in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, substantially improved
the chances for a successful separation and transition to democracy. The
transition, while not threatened from an internal counter-revolution, does remain
threatened by the aggressive posture of northern Sudan. In fact, one cannot really
consider the Arab Spring to have run its full course until there is a democratic
transformation in northern Sudan, and President Bashir stands before the ICC to
face his indictment for genocide in Darfur.
For those seeking democratic transition in the Arab Spring movement, the
prospect of free and fair elections was - and in some cases, still is - a dream worth
risking their lives for. The cases of Iraq and South Sudan illuminate the challenges
involved in transitioning to democracy, as well as the importance of democratic
change. In Sudan, conflicts constantly threatened the implementation of the peace
agreement and continue to pose a risk to the stability of South Sudan. In Iraq,
democratic elections were both volatile and polarizing. Our knowledge of the
origins, progression, and future of the Arab Spring will be much improved by
considering these two recent democratic transitions.
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More than a year and a half after the Arab Spring began, some states in the
region continue to be in turmoil, while others are just beginning their democratic
transitions. By learning these simple, short-term lessons from a review of the first
year of the Arab Spring, the U.S. and its allies can better respond to the continued
calls for democratic transformation in the region, and improve their efforts to
promote stable and lasting transitions.
